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In this paper, I will present Bradley’s two main arguments against the reality of re-
lations. Whereas one of the arguments is highly specic to Bradley’s metaphysical
background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only
to ontological pluralism, but especially to states of aairs as an ontological cate-
gory. Amongst the proponents of states-of-aairs ontologies, two groups can be
distinguished: One group holds states of aairs to be complexes consisting of their
particular and universal constituents alone, the other group holds that there has to
be a “unifying relation” of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of aairs.
Bradley’s regress is oen conceived to be a compelling argument against the rst
and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over
the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley’s regress nor in other respects.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays most analytic philosophers know F. H. Bradley’s name primar-
ily through his famous regress argument, Bradley’s regress (sometimes also
known as the ‘instantiation regress’ or the ‘exemplication regress’). Al-
though various and rather dierent presentations of the argument can be
found in the literature—some of which would surely not appeal to Bradley
himself—the regress argument indeed stems from Bradley, even though a
closely related argument can be traced back through themiddle ages to Plato
in a more rudimentary form.1 Even though many analytic philosophers are
not particularly fond of history, it is rather interesting to examine Bradley’s
regress argument in light of its historic context.
Corresponding author’s address: Holger Leerho, Department of Philosophy, University of
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1 See (Abaelardus 1970, 158f), and the rst part of Plato’s Parmenides.
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In the rst part of this paper, I will focus on the regress argument in the
context of Bradley’s philosophy. In the second part, I will present a rough
sketch of Russell’s ontology from his Logical Atomism phase, which devel-
oped to a certain degree out of his severe criticism of Bradley’s metaphysics.
In the third part, I will discuss the problem from a more systematic point of
view, trying to evaluate the force of Bradley’s regress argument for states-of-
aairs ontologies akin to that of Russell.
2. Bradley’s idealistic monism
Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924) was the most eminent British philoso-
pher at around 1900; hemay even be regarded as the greatest British philoso-
pher between Mill and Russell. He belonged to the most inuential philo-
sophical school in turn-of-the-century Britain, the British Idealists, whose
members dissociated themselves explicitly from the empiricist British tra-
dition and took their inspirations from continental philosophers, especially
from Kant and Hegel. Further important members of that school were Ber-
nard Bosanquet, T. H. Green, Harold Joachim and J. M. E. McTaggart.
Bradley did important work in ethics, logic, and metaphysics, and in
spite of the fact that he was extremely inuential in his lifetime, his historic
inuence is rather meagre. From 1870 on he held a fellowship in Merton
College, Oxford, with no teaching duties. Since he had a weak constitution,
he led a rather reclusive life; R. G. Collingwood writes in his autobiography
that he lived next door to Bradley in Oxford for about sixteen years without
ever seeing him.2 Rumour has it that Bradley combined his aection for
guns with his aversion to cats by going hunting in the college grounds at
night.3
Bradley’s most important work in metaphysics is his Appearance and
Reality (1893) where he distinguishes two spheres: appearance, consisting
of those entities that are inconsistent, and reality, which is the consistent
sphere. His Appearance and Reality consists of two books: the rst, ‘Appear-
ance’, is the destructive part and is intended to show that our whole being
and knowledge is characterised by inconsistencies; the second part, ‘Real-
ity’, is intended to give a description of the consistent sphere. According to
Bradley, independently existing entities are the only entities that can be real
and no object of our experience or thinking can full this requirement.e
one and only real entity is the Absolute (which is a kind of experience in the
broadest sense). Bradley’s metaphysics can therefore be characterized by the
2 See (Collingwood 1970, 16).
3 See (Candlish 2006); though I have no idea whether this is really true, it is too nice a detail
to omit from this paper.
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motto “reality is one”. All our ideas and all our objects of perception, even
we ourselves, are nomore than pragmatic useful abstractions of theAbsolute
and must be classied as mere appearance. It is not surprising that this has
severe consequences for our thinking. In judging, we always refer to objects
but are unable to grasp their “oneness”: to have complete knowledge of an
object, we would have to knowwhat the object is as well as what it is not; but
in order to know the latter, we would have to know the Absolute, which is
impossible for us. So much for a very short glimpse of Bradley’s theories. A
closer look at Bradley’s attitude towards relations will lead us to his regress
argument.
According to Bradley, all relations are dyadic, i.e., holding between ex-
actly two terms, and these two terms have to be dierent. So neither is iden-
tity a relation (due to the fact that its terms are not dierent) nor are re-
lations between three or more terms counting as relations for Bradley. He
argued that statements about relations cannot be (fully) true since there is
only one single object. Bradley nevertheless held that relations are essential
for epistemology and for common sense: all our judgements are relational,
the objects of our experience are dierent from one another (and dierence
is a relation), and so on. Nonetheless, relations are not real, they belong to
the sphere of appearance:
Relations, we saw, are a development of and from the felt totality.
ey inadequately express, and they still imply in the background
that unity apart from which the diversity is nothing. Relations are
unmeaning except within and on the basis of a substantial whole, and
related terms, if made absolute, are forthwith destroyed. Plurality and
relatedness are but features and aspects of a unity. (Bradley 1897, 125)
e core arguments of the rst book of Appearance and Reality are directed
against the reality of relations. Bradley goes as far as claiming that
[t]he reader who has followed and has grasped the principle of this
chapter, will have little need to spend his time upon those which suc-
ceed it. He will have seen that our experience, where relational, is not
true; and hewill have condemned, almost without a hearing, the great
mass of phenomena. (Bradley 1897, 29)
Bradley has two arguments to demonstrate the unreality of relations:
1. If the relation R and its terms a and b were real, then there would
be no way to explain how the relation between R and a, b could be
established (see Bradley 1897, ch. II).is is the famous regress ar-
gument.
2. What is inconsistent has to be classied as appearance. Now, (i) terms
presuppose relations (without the dierence relation there could be
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only one term); (ii) relations presuppose terms (without at least two
dierent terms there could be no relations). According to Bradley,
(i) and (ii) are inconsistent, therefore relations belong to the sphere
of appearance and are not real (see Bradley 1897, ch. III).
e second argument looks a bit weird at rst, but an example can make
things clearer. In order for there to be dierent colours, there has to be a re-
lation of dierence (or colour-dierence). But such a relation can only exist
if there are dierent colours beforehand! ere can be no relation without
there being relata, there can be no relata without there being a relation. It is a
little bit like the hen-and-egg puzzle.is second argument is not very plau-
sible and is very specic to the context provided by Bradley’s metaphysics; it
has been largely ignored, and I will gladly follow that tradition and focus on
the rst argument:
Here is the locus classicus for Bradley’s regress argument:
. . . [the relation] being something itself, if it does not itself bear a re-
lation to the terms, in what intelligible way will it succeed in being
anything to them? But here [. . . ] we are hurried o into the eddy of
a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on nding new relations
without end.e links are united by a link, and this bond of union is
a link which also has two ends; and these require each a fresh link to
connect them with the old. e problem is to nd how the relation
can stand to its qualities; and this problem is insoluble. (Bradley 1897,
27f)
What Bradley actually says is this: Let us suppose that there are two entities
a and b standing in a relation R to each other:4
aRb.
According to Bradley, we are in need of a further relation actually uniting
or, as he put it, “linking” the entities; let us call this relation L. Since Bradley
held that all relations were dyadic, i.e., relating exactly two terms, we need
not one L but L1 and L2 here, L1 linking a to R and L2 linking R to b:
aL1RL2b.
Now the problem is that L1 and L2 are themselves relations and are again in
need of relations linking them to their respective terms. So there must be
further linking relations L′1–L′4:
aL′1L1L′2RL′3L2L′4b.
4 I will use inx-notation here to make the matter clearer.
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On the next level we are in need of further linking relations L′′1 –L′′8 to link
the four L′-relations to their respective terms. e whole matter gets more
and more complex on each level without ever reaching an end, since every
fresh linking relation must in turn be linked to its two terms. According to
Bradley, the whole concept of relations is obviously inconsistent, and there-
fore relations cannot be real.
Bradley’s exclusive use of dyadic relations makes the matter needlessly
complicated, and one might suspect that at least part of the problem can be
found here. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as the regress argument is not
dependent on this rather anomalous constraint. Without it, the whole thing
does indeed look simpler but the very same problem arises, as can be seen
in this alternative formulation of the last formula:
L′(L(Rab)).
Here, we have only one (new) linking relation on each level, in each step of
the regress. Nonetheless, you need a fresh L, L′, L′′ etc. on each level to link
the former relation to its terms, without ever reaching an end.
It is interesting to observe that Bradley’s notion of relations supports his
metaphysical monism: Suppose that a and b stand in the relation of colour-
samenessG to each other: Gab.e entities a, b, andG belong to the sphere
of appearance, the whole concept of relations even is, as we have seen, in-
consistent. According to Bradley it is better to regard the whole matter as a
case of predication instead of relation: the larger object, the “sum”5 of a and
b, [ab], has a property E, monochromacity, which corresponds to the ap-
parent relation G: E[ab].is way, the objects of appearance become larger
and larger and thus come closer to the Absolute. Judgements about larger
objects come can closer to the truth, but still no judgement can be absolutely
true, since in every judgement object and property are necessarily separated.
Pluralism and relations are indispensable in the sphere of appearance but
nonetheless inconsistent; they are not real. Bradley’s conception of relations
leads to a fusion—or, at least, supports the combination—of idealism and
monism.
Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were both raised in the time of British
Idealism, and one of their teachers, McTaggart, was a famous member of
that school. From 1898 onwards Russell and Moore argued against these
two convictions, idealism and monism. is revolt is oen regarded as the
5 It is not clear what exactly this “sum” is supposed to be; it is a kind of “larger” object con-
sisting of a and b. Since a, b and their sum as well are no more than abstractions from the
Absolute, it seems wrong to regard this sum as a mereological sum. In this paper, I will
refer to this kind of sum by the use of its “parts” in square brackets.
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beginning of analytic philosophy. Generally speaking, Moore with his re-
alism focused on idealism, Russell with his pluralism focused on monism.
In the next part I will discuss some of Russell’s arguments against Bradley’s
metaphysics.
3. Russell’s criticism
Bradley’s philosophy has some rather absurd consequences. Russell’s crit-
icism of Bradley can be found in his Principles of Mathematics and in an
interesting discussion with Bradley in several issues of Mind from around
1910.
In Bradley’s metaphysics, relations presuppose terms and terms presup-
pose relations; his alternative proposal, predication (theDoctrine of Internal
Relations, as Russell calls it), is equally inconsistent.6 Even a predication
of Bradley’s only genuine object, the Absolute (e.g., ‘e Absolute is real’), is
necessarily inconsistent—so, obviously, you cannot have any true statements
in this philosophical system. In mathematics, the situation is not any better,
as even mathematical truths are not absolutely true. Russell, on the other
hand, was certain that mathematical truths are “totally” true and that truth
is not a matter of degrees. A further important point raised by Russell is
that some indispensable relations cannot be converted to or translated into
a subject-predicate form as suggested by Bradley. Confronted with Russell’s
criticism, Bradley explicitly accepted it and regarded the arguments as evi-
dence for his philosophy, since appearance—where all this stu belongs—is
indeed inconsistent. It is extremely dicult to argue against such a posi-
tion. Since Russell’s criticism of Bradley’s handling of relations is of utmost
importance, I will present it in some more detail.
For the present context, asymmetric7 relations are of special interest: if
Rab, then ∼Rba. Examples are relations such as ‘. . . is larger than . . . ’, ‘. . . is
earlier than . . . ’—relations which can establish an order; they are most im-
portant for mathematics.
According to Bradley, all relation statements are actually “disguised”
subject-predicate statements. Hence, writes Russell, it must be possible to
analyse all relation statements as statements in subject-predicate form. Two
prominent ways have been opted for to analyse relation statements in this
way:
Let some relation Rab be given. It can be analysed as
6 Properties, i.e., monadic relations, are equally subject to Bradley’s regress argument, since
a property has to be related to its term. Russell raises this point in (Russell 1996, §53).
7 As a matter of fact, all antisymmetric relations could be used here, but for brevity’s sake
(and because it makes the matter clearer) I will conne myself to asymmetric (meaning
antisymmetric and irreexive) relations.
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1. a and b’s each having a dierent property “including” the other ob-
ject: Rb(a) ∧ Ra(b);
2. a and b’s constituting a (new) object having a certain property P:
P[ab].
For some relations, these suggestions seem to provide an eective and con-
venient way of preserving the information given in a relation statement and
transforming it into subject-predicate form. But let R be an asymmetric re-
lation and evaluate option (1). e objects a and b each have a dierent
property “including” the other object: Rb(a)∧Ra(b). Such a solution can be
found in Leibniz: ‘a (is larger than) b’ is analysed as ‘a (is larger than b) and
b (is not larger than a)’. Analysed this way, the former relata become non-
analysable elements of new properties, even though they obviously should
be analysable; the manner of reference “in” the properties remains obscure
and it would be hard (to say the least) tomakemore general statements about
structural properties of relations, e.g., formulating the criterion for transitiv-
ity. Furthermore, given one object with all its properties, all further objects
would be somehow referred to by its properties.8 is is certainly an inter-
esting and even information-preserving approach. However, it is not par-
ticularly valuable, as its complex properties cannot be analysed eectively.
Let us have a look at option (2), which is Bradley’s approach:e two relata
a and b are replaced with their “sum” [ab] (a “larger” object consisting of
the two relata) and the supposed relation R is analysed as a corresponding
property P’s applying to the new object (an example for this was given at the
end of the preceding part). But if Rab were indeed equivalent to P[ab], then
(since [ab] = [ba]—the new object has no internal order or structure), Rab
would be equivalent to P[ba] and thus to Rba—the direction of the relation
would be lost. So there would be noway of tellingwhether the analysed form
of ‘a (is larger than) b’, viz., ‘[ab] is P’, means that a is larger than b or that b
is larger than a. In contrast to option (1), even the information expressed in
the relation statement has been lost.
So, Bradley’s approach is obviously unable to maintain the structural
properties of relations, especially their “sense” or “direction”—which, in the
case of antisymmetric relations, is a serious problem. Leibniz’ approach fares
better in regard to this aspect but has far-reaching problems in explaining
the manner of reference involved in the complex “relational properties”. To
sum up, the traditional subject-predicate logic seems unt to express what
some types of relation statements express. According to Russell, a logic t
for handling relation statements has to be “atomic” or “pluralistic” and must
supply a set of methods for working with relations.
8 Of course, this reminds one of Leibniz’Monadology.
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But what has Russell to say with respect to Bradley’s arguments against
relations? Bradley’s two arguments are supposed to be evidence against the
reality of relations: (1) Bradley’s regress, (2) relations and their terms pre-
suppose each other. In the context of a pluralistic ontology like Russell’s,
argument (2) is quite harmless: both terms and relations belong to separate
and (more or less) independent categories. According to Russell, the world
consists of particulars, universals and—I will elaborate on that later—facts.
ere is not one thing, one single whole, but there is a plurality of dier-
ent, independent entities. You do not have to ask whether the relata or the
relation, the hen or the egg, came rst; both are simply there.
Argument (1), one the other hand, seems to be far more serious. Even
granted that there are particulars and relations as entities: each relation be-
tween two entities is again an entity—butwhat connects these entities,makes
them a whole, establishes the unity of the fact? Even if there are a, b, and R,
how can they form a unity, how can R actually relate a and b? Russell’s so-
lution of this problem reminds one of Frege’s: According to Frege, relations
are not really independent objects (like their relata) but unsaturated entities,
in Russell’s terminology: universals.
As an alternative to Bradley’s Doctrine of Internal Relations, Russell pre-
sents his Doctrine of External Relations: On the linguistic side, we have the
symbols a, b, and R, each denoting an entity “in the world.” ‘Rab’ expresses
that the two particulars a and b stand in the relation R to one another; but R
is not a particular like a and b, it is a universal, an unsaturated entity with as
many “gaps” as particulars can be related by it. If there actually is a combi-
nation of a, b, and R in the world, if ‘Rab’ is true, then a and b “saturate” R;
the corresponding complex in the world is called a fact. No further “glue”, no
further linking relation is necessary to combine the entities. e saturation
of the universal is not a further relation; the universal itself, as the relating
relation of the fact, holds the fact together.
To sumup: In Russell, particulars do exist as independent entities; in ad-
dition to these entities, there are properties and relations—universals which,
in Russell’s terminology, subsist.9 Particulars have properties and stand in
various relations to one another. It makes no dierence to R, a, and b as
entities whether Rab or ∼Rab is the case. e having of properties and the
standing in relations to each another are facts. A fact is “[. . . ] the kind of
thing that makes a proposition true or false” (Russell 1989, 182); their exis-
tence is “a truism” (loc. cit.). Facts are objective objects in the world, and
form a third ontological category.ey are more than the sum of their com-
ponents. What holds facts (or, to use a more common expression, states of
aairs) together, what establishes their unity, are the unsaturated universals
9 is is only a matter of terminology, not of ‘gradual existence’.
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as relating relations.
is proposal of Russell has one serious aw. According to the early Rus-
sell of the Principles, every denoting phrase denotes an existing entity in the
world.10 Now take the following case: (A) ‘a is red’—the saturated partic-
ular a has the unsaturated property (universal) of being red. (B) ‘red is not
blue’—the saturated entities red and blue stand in the unsaturated relation
(universal) of being dierent to each other. How is it possible that red is an
unsaturated entity in (A) and a saturated entity in (B)? And is this saturated
entity a particular or another kind of universal? According to Russell, only
the actual relating relation—the “top-level relation”—of the state of aairs
is unsaturated; this is not satisfying, since it remains in the dark what, e.g.,
saturated red is supposed to be: both particular and universal? e matter
reminds one of Frege’s argument with Kerry inÜber Begri und Gegenstand
(Concept and Object); there seem to be concepts which fall under another
concept.11
With his eory of Descriptions from 1905, Russell developed the idea
of incomplete symbols: Many words and expressions, e.g., descriptions (both
denite and indenite), class expressions, predicates and relation expres-
sions, do not denote entities. Taken in isolation, these expressions are even
meaningless.ey can be evaluated only in the context of a proposition: ‘the
present rector of the University of Tartu’ is meaningless; ‘e present rector
of theUniversity of Tartu exists’, on the other hand, ismeaningful (and a true
statement about Alar Karis). Now, predicates and relation expressions have
to be interpreted as incomplete symbols, too, not as names for properties
and relations, i.e., for universals. According to this theory, ‘Red is not blue’
is not a proposition about universals but about particulars: all that is said
is that there is no particular that is both (completely) red and (completely)
blue. e correct symbol for a putative property or relation is the symbol
for a propositional function like ‘yˆ is red’—expressed this way, their unsat-
uratedness is made explicit.12 Russell’seory of Types is a perfect device to
explain Frege’s notion of second (or, more general, dierent) order concepts.
Taken this way, the double-role problem vanishes.
Russell’s logic is much more compatible with common sense than the
traditional subject-predicate logic and also able to cope with all kinds of re-
lation statements. It suggests a radically dierent ontology, with particu-
10 See, e.g., (Russell 1996, §§46f)
11 See (Frege 1892).
12 See, e.g, (Whitehead and Russell 1962, Introduction, ch. III). Nonetheless, the ontologi-
cal status of propositional functions is by no means clear. ere might be universals cor-
responding to some propositional functions—Russell himself would surely subscribe to
this—but the device of propositional functions allows for predicates and relation expres-
sions which do not correspond to any universal.
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lars, universals and facts (states of aairs) as distinct ontological categories;
Russell’s ontology is a states-of-aairs ontology (not unlikeWittgenstein’s in
the Tractatus). Russell and Wittgenstein both realised the threat posed by
Bradley’s regress and were convinced that their systems were not subject to
it. Russell’s universals as well as Wittgenstein’s Gegenstände are unsaturated
entities: both philosophers saw no need to have any further “linking” rela-
tions to explain the unity of their states of aairs.
4. Bradley’s regress and states of aairs
Assessments of Bradley’s regress dier extraordinarily. On the one hand, one
nds quotations like this one:
Charity bids us avert our eyes from the pitiable spectacle of a great
philosopher using an argument whichwould disgrace a child or a sav-
age. (Broad 1933, 85)
On the other hand, Bradley’s regress is discussed again and again as a plau-
sible argument against states-of-aairs ontologies. In this section, I will dis-
cuss two approaches to the regress problem brought forward by proponents
of such theories. Fromone standpoint, we see positions like the one sketched
above, taken e.g. by Russell, the Tractatus-Wittgenstein, and D. M. Arm-
strong.13 ese authors consider Bradley’s regress as more or less a non-
issue: they regard the unity of a state of aairs as a brute fact. From another
standpoint, many authors try to escape the threat posed by the regress ar-
gument by postulating a special kind of exemplication relation which does
establish the unity of states of aairs but is not itself in need of further link-
ing relations, so that the the regress is stopped once the unity is established.
Before discussing these two approaches, it is valuable to investigate whether
Bradley’s regress is a serious problem at all.
In the literature, Bradley’s regress is sometimes classied as a virtuous
regress, sometimes (and more oen) as a vicious one. Furthermore, it can
be observed that there is no consensus regarding the actual area in which the
regress occurs: in propositions or in states of aairs.e regress seems to be
more serious in the area of states of aairs (since propositions are somewhat
dubious entities anyway), so I will concentrate on that area. If one classies
the regress as vicious, surely an alternative is called for. But even a virtuous
regress is something one would want to avoid, if possible.
13 At least I take this to be the position Armstrong puts forward in (Armstrong 1989a, 1989b,
1997). In (Armstrong 2004) he adopts a position akin to that of Donald Baxter and regards
states of aairs as entities which kind of ‘supervene’ on their constituent particulars and
universals; I will not discuss that approach here.
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To illustrate at which points the two approaches mentioned above at-
tack Bradley’s regress argument, I want to oer the following crude recon-
struction of the argument. I think that Bradley’s regress can be regarded as
resulting from the combination of two principles:14
(P1) When particulars and universals are related then there has to be a
further relation which does the linking.
(P2) Relations are universals.
Now, suppose that
a and b are related by R (e.g., ‘a is larger than b’); then
there has to be an L such that L(Rab) (with P1);
L is a universal (with P2);
there has to be an L′ such that L′(L(Rab)) (with P1);
L′ is a universal (with P2);
there has to be an L′′ such that L′′(L′(L(Rab))) (with P1);
. . .
Let us have a look at some of the options to escape this regress:
1. Principle (P1) can be attacked: there is no exemplifying relation do-
ing the linking, the universals as “relating relations” are doing the
trick by themselves.
2. Principle (P2) does not hold for the exemplication relation; the rst
step of the regress must be taken, but the result is a unit not held to-
gether anymore by a universal but rather by a special kind of relation.
e rst option is taken by Russell and, until recently, by Armstrong.
Wittgenstein’s solution (“In a state of aairs, the objects hang one in another
like the links in a chain”, Wittgenstein 1974, 2.03) can be regarded as being
14 I do not intend to give a universal reconstruction of the argument. Bradley’s regress can oc-
cur in lots of areas (states of aairs, propositions etc.) and can be regarded as an argument
against a lot of dierent ontological systems. Furthermore, some systems are “immune” to
the regress due to other reasons (e.g., Armstrong’s most recent approach and ontologies
based on non-transferable tropes have states of aairs as entities which kind of “supervene”
on their constituents). I will conne myself to plain-vanilla cases here—the two principles
are only intended to illustrate two common ways of arguing against Bradley’s regress.
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closely related to this, though he does not talk about particulars and univer-
sals in the Tractatus. According to this rst approach, it is it is a mere façon
de parler to say that a and b “exemplify” or “instantiate” R. All that is being
said is that Rab is the case. Not every relation expression (amongst others,
‘exemplies’) has a corresponding relation.e unity of the state of aairs is
an ontologically brute fact.
Proponents of the second option say that the constituents of a state of
aairs are linked by an internal “non-relational tie” (Strawson), a “nexus”
(Bergmann), a “fundamental tie” (as Armstrong calles it), a certain relation
of exemplication to establish the specic state of aairs. It is important to
observe that these “unifying relations”, as I want to call them, are supposed
not to be universals like ordinary relations are. is way, the regress can-
not take o (since (P1) does not apply to the unifying relation). Strawson
and Bergmann explicitly mention Bradley’s regress as the reason for their
relating entities not being universals.15
Why should one opt for such a solution instead of the brute-fact ap-
proach? Can such a unifying relation be useful—that is, apart from “ex-
plaining” in an ontological sense that a state of aairs forms a unity? Two
issues spring to mind.
e rst is that Russell’s unsaturated universals are a bit hard to grasp.
Could one get around these entities? As we have seen, Bradley’s regress can
be stopped with option 2: the unifying relation is a special kind of relation,
and maybe it could take over the unsaturatedness from the universals with-
out being a universal itself. Again, antisymmetric relations seem to pose a
serious problem for this approach. Suppose that we have a unifying relation
L, a “saturated universal” R* and two particulars a and b. Due to the unsat-
uratedness of L, we could have a state of aairs L(R*ab). Now, the dierence
between R*ab and a corresponding state of aairs with an unsaturated R,
i.e., Rab, is a bit hard to grasp. Can a saturated universal have a direction,
a sense? In writing down and reading symbols we are accustomed to inter-
pret them as standing in a certain relation already, so R*ab suggests that a is
coming rst, is standing in R* to b. In talking about unsaturated relations,
we can suppose that R has a “front gap” and a “back gap”. Your putting a spe-
cic particular in each of these gaps can explain why the two states of aairs
Rab and Rba are dierent—in the one case, a occupies the front gap and b
occupies the back one, in the other case the roles are reversed. A saturated
universal has no gaps, no direction, so how can R*ab and R*ba be distin-
guished? Maybe this is soluble by introducing some further non-universal
connector relations, but that would be rather intricate.
15 See (Strawson 1990, 167; Körner 1968, 65f)
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e second issue is that a state of aairs is dierent from themereological
sum or the set of its constituents. Could a unifying relation provide means
to use one of these less problematic complexes instead of states of aairs? A
mereological sum has no structure; the states of aairs Rab and Rba, taken
as sums (R+a+b) of their constituents, could not be distinguished. A unify-
ing relation as a further component would make no dierence. Sets are no
better o: A set has no structure; the states of aairs Rab and Rba, taken
as sets ({R,a,b}), could not be distinguished. Again, a unifying relation as a
further element wouldmake no dierence to thematter. As in the rst issue,
the structure of the state of aairs is the problem here.
It seems that, regarding states of aairs, two phenomena are particularly
peculiar:
1. How can a state of aairs be a unit?
2. How can a state of aairs have a structure?
e approaches which work with some kind of unifying relation—at least
the ones I know of—claim to give a better explanation for the unity prob-
lem (1) than the brute-fact approach does, where the unsaturated universals
as relating relations establish the unity of the state of aairs. In my opinion
they fail to do so. To be sure, the talk about the unsaturatedness of the uni-
versals and about “gaps” seems to be a kind of metaphor, but I do not think
that anything better can be said about their competitors. Furthermore, the
alternative approaches only take the whole problem one step further: that
there is a nexus, a non-relational tie, or whatever, uniting a, b, and R to
the state of aairs Rab, surely is a way to answer the ontological question
of how the unity of a state of aairs is established. But one could ask again
how the nexus or the non-relational tie unites these entities. e answer to
this question can hardly be more satisfactory than the criticised answer of
the brute-fact proponents. An additional problem is that the alternatives fail
to give an explanation of the direction problem (2) or have to resort to un-
saturated universals (like the brute-fact approach does) or weird connector
relations for this purpose.
So far, there seem to be no really compelling reasons for accepting any
sort of unifying relation. In spite of that, some authors think that one can-
not do without such a relation; they defend their case by oering arguments
against the brute-fact approach. One of the most radical defenders of such
a unifying relation (though of a dierent kind as discussed here) is William
Vallicella. In his (Vallicella 2002) he oers three arguments against the brute-
fact approach:
1. According to the brute-fact approach, the state of aairs Rab can be
analysed to have the constituents R, a, and b (and no further con-
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stituents). Nonetheless, the existence of R, a, and b does not entail
the existence of Rab: the state of aairs Rab is a further entity in ad-
dition to them and irreducible to them. Now Vallicella states, taking
the side of David Lewis,16 that it is contradictory to say of a whole
that it is an entity over and above its parts when it is composed of
them.17 No matter how hard I try, I cannot see any contradiction
here.
2. How can states of aairs be recognised as states of aairs, what do
they have in common? Vallicella argues that if one had a further
entity (e.g., a unication relation) as a component in every state of
aairs, that could do the trick. Since the states of aairs in the brute-
fact approach do not have such a common entity, the approach must
fail.18 Against that, it seems to me that states of aairs can be recog-
nised by their being complex entities. Mereological sums and classes
are complex too, but they are not part of the “genuine ontological
existents”—so, states of aairs are (and perhaps have to be?) the only
ontological complexes around.
3. According to the brute-fact approach, two states of aairs can have
the very same constituents but nonetheless be dierent: Rab vs. Rba.
Vallicella claims that it is not possible that complexes consisting of
the same constituents dier, as can be seen inmereological sums and
sets.19 ough the sets {R,a,b} and {R,b,a} as well as the sums R+a+b
and R+b+a are indeed identical, the states of aairs Rab and Rba are
not: It does make a dierence whether a is larger than b or b is larger
than a. And this dierence is not a matter of some (additional) com-
ponents or external uniers but rather one of the structure of these
states of aairs, which is, again, not reducible to its components.
Let us have a nal look at some of the features of the brute-fact approach:
e resulting ontological system is very parsimonious but nonetheless pow-
erful.ere are no classes (Russell’sNo-Classeory), nomereological sums
(in Armstrong, these are supervening entities—an “ontological free lunch”),
no “exemplication”, “instantiation”, “unication” or whatever as a relation
or operator leading a kind of shadow-existence by being a non-universal re-
lation. e unity and the structure of states of aairs are brute facts: what
establishes their unity and their structure (and allows us to tell Rab from R,
16 See (Lewis 1992, 213).
17 See (Vallicella 2002, 20f).
18 See (Vallicella 2002, 21f).
19 See (Vallicella 2002, 22).
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a, b and from Rba) cannot be explained. States of aairs are a third onto-
logical category in addition to particulars and universals.
5. Concluding remarks
In the historical context, the discussion about Bradley’s regress shows that
Bradley’s treatment of relations was rather clever and that he recognised the
importance of relations for our understanding of the world. Contrary to
what can oen be read, his regress argument was not intended to show that
“internal” relations are a suitable alternative to “external” relations (as, e.g.,
Russell presents the argument). Bradley’s criticism focused on pluralism (in
his Appearance and Reality) and on states of aairs (in his later discussion
with Russell); he held both to be impossible.
In the systematic context, the discussion about Bradley’s regress shows
that ontologies with states of aairs (not “supervening” on non-transferable
tropes, partially identical particulars and universals, etc.) are still subject to
Bradley’s challenge and that there is no generally accepted solution to the
problem. In my opinion, the approaches including a kind of non-universal
unifying relation have no signicant advantage over the clear and parsi-
monious brute-fact approach that can be found in, amongst others, Russell
(during his Logical Atomism and early Neutral Monism period) and, until
recently, in Armstrong. So, withOccam’s razor, we should opt for the simpler
approach.
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